Actualidad: Religión y Geopolítica

ACTUALIDAD: RELIGIÓN Y GEOPOLÍTICA

La antigua alianza de URSS con SIRIA, se reaviva con la alianza Putin-Assad, donde el lider genocida de Siria, utiliza los bombardeos rusos para eliminar la oposición política que evito la "primavera siria" (marzo-junio 2011), y que dió inicio a la terrible guerra civil en Siria. 

En esta lucha global de intereses geopolíticos, el pueblo sirio es masacrado escapando en masa a Europa, donde son mal vistos y recibidos por el neofascismo antiislamico europeista que risueñamente apoya a Putin y sus bombardeos indiscriminados. 

Por su parte el Patriarca de Rusia, postula una doctrina de "civilización ortodoxa" siguiendo los postulados del geopolitico norteamericano Samuel Huntington ("El choque de civilizaciones" 1996), donde respalda la lucha contra el fundamentalismo islámico, teniendo Rusia ya "antecedentes" en tiempos de Yelsin-Putin, por el genocidio perpetrado contra el pueblo checheno. 

La ortodoxia mundial no puede permitir crimenes en su nombre como los que se realizó en Chechenia y ahora en Siria. Cuanto mas crimenes del mundo cristiano romano y ortodoxo se realicen en nombre de la "libertad", "democracia" y "derechos humanos", el fundamentalismo islámico crecerá en su extremismo.  El ISIS es la consecuencia de todos estos males: una reacción desmedida contra todos estos atropellos.

Vladyka TEOFANO, Juan Manuel Garayalde

Archieparquia de la República Argentina

Iglesia Ortodoxa Bielorrusa Eslava en el Extranjero

 

Para Gran Bretaña, Putin fortalece a Estado Islámico en vez de combatirlo

Según el canciller británico, Philip Hammond, con el fin de defender al régimen sirio los rusos bombardean a grupos que luchan contra el grupo extremista.

 Martes 02 de febrero de 2016

 Agencia Reuters

 http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1867466-para-gran-bretana-putin-fortalece-a-ei-en-vez-de-combartirlo

 El presidente ruso, Vladimir Putin.Foto:Reuters

ZAATARI, Jordania.- Las divisiones de las potencias por la guerra en Siria siguen latentes. El canciller británico, Philip Hammond, dijo que el presidente ruso, Vladimir Putin, socava los esfuerzos de la comunidad internacional de poner fin al conflicto al bombardear a grupos que luchan contra Estado Islámico (EI) en un intento por respaldar al presidente sirio Bashar al-Assad.

En una señal de frustración con el Kremlin, Hammond criticó a Putin por hablar de sus esfuerzos para colaborar con un proceso político en Siria que ponga fin a la violencia en Siria, al tiempo que ataca a los opositores de Al-Assad, que las potencias occidentales esperan que ayuden a restaurar el orden en el país una vez que el presidente abandone el poder.

El ingreso de Rusia al conflicto en septiembre pasado cambió el balance de poder y ayudó sobre todo a Al-Assad que había sufrido varias derrotas graves en el inicio del 2015.

"Es lamentable que todo lo que estamos haciendo es socavado por los rusos", dijo Hammond anteayer en el campo de refugiados de Zaatari en Jordania, a unos 10 kilómetros al sur de la frontera con Siria.

"Los rusos dicen 'hablemos', y luego hablan y hablan y hablan. El problema con los rusos es que cuando hablan están bombardeando, y ayudan a Al-Assad", destacó Hammond.

Moscú dice que su objetivo es un amplio rango de militantes en Siria, no solamente EI, aunque insiste en que se enfoca en ese grupo. Por su parte, los funcionarios rusos dicen que Occidente juega con fuego al tratar de derrocar a Al-Aassad.

Los rebeldes y residentes dicen que los ataques aéreos rusos están dejando centenares de víctimas civiles en bombardeos indiscriminados de áreas densamente pobladas lejos del frente de batalla.

*       *       *

 

The Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate resembles the CPSU of Soviet times

Paul A. Goble

 http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/01/22/the-russian-orthodox-church-of-the-moscow-patriarchate-resembles-the-cpsu-of-soviet-times/#arvlbdata

EuromaidanPress.com  - 2016/01/22

 Three important articles this week in the Moscow media suggest that the Russian Orthodox Church under Moscow Patriarch Kirill is ever less a religious organization and ever more one that recalls and is best understood by drawing analogies with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

First, in an interview in “Novaya gazeta,” Boris Knorre, a specialist on religion at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, describes the way “political orthodoxy” has become “an ideology justifying war with the entire world” and why “the temptation to feel oneself a hero of ‘a holy war’” is so great.

“Politicized groups close to the church existed throughout the 1990s,” but until 2004, they did not receive the support of the Moscow Patriarchate. In that year, then-metropolitan Kirill issued his “so-called doctrine of Orthodox civilization” based on the ideas of Samuel Huntington and encouraged the political orthodox to become more active.

Kirill didn’t elaborate, but his aides and supporters did, with some arguing that political Orthodoxy requires that people “again learn to die and kill” and others arguing that the church should oppose a market economy and do everything possible to promote “the unity of the church, the people and the state.”

In Russia today, the state uses Orthodoxy and Orthodoxy uses the state, “and each step of one intensifies the response of the other.” One area where that is especially true is in foreign policy. “Imperial ideas of political Orthodoxy are quite popular in the church milieu,” Knorre says.

 Russian soldiers line up near the border of Ukraine to kiss an “icon” of Putin. Summer 2014 (Image: Social media)

 In Russia today, the state uses Orthodoxy and Orthodoxy uses the state, “and each step of one intensifies the response of the other.” One area where that is especially true is in foreign policy. “Imperial ideas of political Orthodoxy are quite popular in the church milieu,” Knorre says.

 

“The believers suffered greatly with the destruction of the USSR – in their consciousness, the Soviet space was sacred Russian land.” Not surprisingly, such people viewed the Kremlin’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine as a chance to realize a return. But they couldn’t have reached the audience they did had it not been for the state.

In many cases, the political Orthodox “would like more radicalization from the president, for example, on questions involving the isolation of the country from the Western world.” Such tensions, although Knorre doesn’t speak to this issue, recall those between committed communists and state pragmatists in Soviet times.

 The Stalin icon was used by Russian Orthodox Hieromonk Afinogen of the St. Afon Abbey for memorial service for Soviet WWII fighters and to give out Prokhorov literary awards to writers belonging to the state-run Russian Writers’ Union. Here with representatives of Russian army veterans and youth military organization. (Image: zavtra.ru)

And Knorre’s words suggest that the Moscow Patriarchate has become part but not the only part of the ideological department of a new “central committee,” again in much the same way that communist ideologues had to coexist with diplomats and statist elements in Soviet times.

Second, in a commentary in Moscow’s “Gazeta” newspaper, Andrey Desnitsky, a specialist on religious affairs, draws a comparison between the way in which the Moscow Patriarchate conducts its business and the way the CPSU did in Soviet times.

“When I was a child, congresses of the CPSU assembled in the capital. Participants reported about successes and denounced enemies, and shared a feel of deep satisfaction and sang the praises of dear comrade Leonid Ilich personally. This was the highest, the most powerful forum … which discussed nothing and which decided nothing.”

Everything was behind the scenes and everything that could be seen was largely meaningless, Desnitsky says. What happened to the CPSU, of course, is well known. But what is tragic is that “now something very similar is happening in church life.” There are enormous problems, but the top has made it clear that “now is not the time for discussion.”

And in the third, Vadim Balytnikov, in “NG-Religii,” talks about the way in which the ideological passions of some in the church and the sense that the church is losing its sway over the laity leads to periodic drives to “cleanse” the priesthood in the hopes of recovery or at least in the hopes of avoiding a revolution from below. 

 Putin with Kirill, the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church (Image: patriarchia.ru)

*      *      *