ACTUALIDAD: RELIGIÓN Y GEOPOLÍTICA
La antigua alianza de URSS con SIRIA, se reaviva con la alianza
Putin-Assad, donde el lider genocida de Siria, utiliza los bombardeos
rusos para eliminar la oposición política que evito la "primavera
siria" (marzo-junio 2011), y que dió inicio a la terrible guerra civil en Siria.
En esta lucha global de intereses geopolíticos, el pueblo sirio
es masacrado escapando en masa a Europa, donde son mal vistos y recibidos por el
neofascismo antiislamico europeista que risueñamente apoya a Putin y sus bombardeos
indiscriminados.
Por su parte el Patriarca de Rusia, postula una doctrina
de "civilización ortodoxa" siguiendo los postulados del geopolitico
norteamericano Samuel Huntington ("El choque de civilizaciones" 1996),
donde respalda la lucha contra el fundamentalismo islámico, teniendo
Rusia ya "antecedentes" en tiempos de Yelsin-Putin, por el genocidio perpetrado contra el pueblo checheno.
La ortodoxia mundial no puede permitir crimenes en su nombre como los
que se realizó en Chechenia y ahora en Siria. Cuanto mas crimenes del
mundo cristiano romano y ortodoxo se realicen en nombre de la
"libertad", "democracia" y "derechos humanos", el fundamentalismo
islámico crecerá en su extremismo. El ISIS es la consecuencia de todos estos males: una reacción desmedida contra todos estos atropellos.
Vladyka TEOFANO, Juan Manuel Garayalde
Archieparquia de la República Argentina
Iglesia Ortodoxa Bielorrusa Eslava en el Extranjero
Para Gran Bretaña, Putin fortalece a Estado Islámico en vez de combatirlo
Según
el canciller británico, Philip Hammond, con el fin de defender al
régimen sirio los rusos bombardean a grupos que luchan contra el grupo
extremista.
Martes 02 de febrero de 2016
Agencia Reuters
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1867466-para-gran-bretana-putin-fortalece-a-ei-en-vez-de-combartirlo
El presidente ruso, Vladimir Putin.Foto:Reuters
ZAATARI, Jordania.- Las divisiones de las potencias por
la guerra en Siria siguen latentes. El canciller británico, Philip Hammond, dijo que el presidente ruso,
Vladimir Putin,
socava los esfuerzos de la comunidad internacional de poner fin al
conflicto al bombardear a grupos que luchan contra Estado Islámico (EI)
en un intento por respaldar al presidente sirio Bashar al-Assad.
En
una señal de frustración con el Kremlin, Hammond criticó a Putin por
hablar de sus esfuerzos para colaborar con un proceso político en Siria
que ponga fin a la violencia en Siria, al tiempo que ataca a los
opositores de Al-Assad, que las potencias occidentales esperan que
ayuden a restaurar el orden en el país una vez que el presidente
abandone el poder.
El ingreso de Rusia al conflicto
en septiembre pasado cambió el balance de poder y ayudó sobre todo a
Al-Assad que había sufrido varias derrotas graves en el inicio del 2015.
"Es
lamentable que todo lo que estamos haciendo es socavado por los rusos",
dijo Hammond anteayer en el campo de refugiados de Zaatari en Jordania,
a unos 10 kilómetros al sur de la frontera con Siria.
"Los rusos
dicen 'hablemos', y luego hablan y hablan y hablan. El problema con los
rusos es que cuando hablan están bombardeando, y ayudan a Al-Assad",
destacó Hammond.
Moscú
dice que su objetivo es un amplio rango de militantes en Siria, no
solamente EI, aunque insiste en que se enfoca en ese grupo. Por su
parte, los funcionarios rusos dicen que Occidente juega con fuego al
tratar de derrocar a Al-Aassad.
Los rebeldes y residentes dicen
que los ataques aéreos rusos están dejando centenares de víctimas
civiles en bombardeos indiscriminados de áreas densamente pobladas lejos
del frente de batalla.
* * *
The Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate resembles the CPSU of Soviet times
Paul A. Goble
http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/01/22/the-russian-orthodox-church-of-the-moscow-patriarchate-resembles-the-cpsu-of-soviet-times/#arvlbdata
EuromaidanPress.com - 2016/01/22
Three important articles this week in the Moscow media suggest that the
Russian Orthodox Church under Moscow Patriarch Kirill is ever less a
religious organization and ever more one that recalls and is best
understood by drawing analogies with the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union.
First, in an
interview in “
Novaya gazeta,” Boris Knorre, a specialist on religion at Moscow’s
Higher School of Economics,
describes the way “political orthodoxy” has become “an ideology
justifying war with the entire world” and why “the temptation to feel
oneself a hero of ‘a holy war’” is so great.
“Politicized groups close to the church existed throughout the
1990s,” but until 2004, they did not receive the support of the Moscow
Patriarchate. In that year, then-metropolitan Kirill issued his
“so-called doctrine of Orthodox civilization” based on the ideas of
Samuel Huntington and encouraged the political orthodox to become more
active.
Kirill didn’t elaborate, but his aides and supporters did, with some
arguing that political Orthodoxy requires that people “again learn to
die and kill” and others arguing that the church should oppose a market
economy and do everything possible to promote “the unity of the church,
the people and the state.”
In Russia today, the state uses Orthodoxy and Orthodoxy uses the
state, “and each step of one intensifies the response of the other.” One
area where that is especially true is in foreign policy. “Imperial
ideas of political Orthodoxy are quite popular in the church milieu,”
Knorre says.
Russian soldiers line up near the border of Ukraine to kiss an “icon” of Putin. Summer 2014 (Image: Social media)
In Russia today, the state uses Orthodoxy and Orthodoxy uses the state,
“and each step of one intensifies the response of the other.” One area
where that is especially true is in foreign policy. “Imperial ideas of
political Orthodoxy are quite popular in the church milieu,” Knorre
says.
“The believers suffered greatly with the destruction of the USSR – in
their consciousness, the Soviet space was sacred Russian land.” Not
surprisingly, such people viewed the Kremlin’s actions in Crimea
and Ukraine as a chance to realize a return. But they couldn’t have
reached the audience they did had it not been for the state.
In many cases, the political Orthodox “would like more radicalization
from the president, for example, on questions involving the isolation
of the country from the Western world.” Such tensions, although Knorre
doesn’t speak to this issue, recall those between committed communists
and state pragmatists in Soviet times.
The Stalin icon was used by Russian Orthodox Hieromonk Afinogen of the
St. Afon Abbey for memorial service for Soviet WWII fighters and to give
out Prokhorov literary awards to writers belonging to the state-run
Russian Writers’ Union. Here with representatives of Russian army
veterans and youth military organization. (Image: zavtra.ru)
And Knorre’s words suggest that the Moscow Patriarchate has become
part but not the only part of the ideological department of a new
“central committee,” again in much the same way that communist
ideologues had to coexist with diplomats and statist elements in Soviet
times.
Second, in a
commentary in Moscow’s “
Gazeta”
newspaper, Andrey Desnitsky, a specialist on religious affairs, draws a
comparison between the way in which the Moscow Patriarchate conducts
its business and the way the
CPSU did in Soviet times.
“When I was a child, congresses of the CPSU assembled in the capital.
Participants reported about successes and denounced enemies, and shared
a feel of deep satisfaction and sang the praises of dear comrade Leonid
Ilich personally. This was the highest, the most powerful forum … which
discussed nothing and which decided nothing.”
Everything was behind the scenes and everything that could be seen
was largely meaningless, Desnitsky says. What happened to the CPSU, of
course, is well known. But what is tragic is that “now something very
similar is happening in church life.” There are enormous problems, but
the top has made it clear that “now is not the time for discussion.”
And in the third, Vadim Balytnikov, in “NG-Religii,” talks
about the way in which the ideological passions of some in the church
and the sense that the church is losing its sway over the laity leads to
periodic drives to “cleanse” the priesthood in the hopes of recovery or
at least in the hopes of avoiding a revolution from below.
Putin with Kirill, the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church (Image: patriarchia.ru)
* * *
